problems that every pluralism faces: ( 1) Why is there a plurality of philosophies? ( 2) How is this plurality related to the one reality? ( 3) Within this plurality, what philosophies are valid? ( 4) How does awareness of the plurality of valid philosophies function in the interpretation of texts? (..) 1 Sources of Pluralism difference in experience (cf William James: dependence of of philosophies on individual character); disagreements not about facts but about values (cf Nicholas Rescher's orientational [perspectival] pluralism); difference in scientific hypotheses to be tested (cf Pierce who grounds truth in the end in a reality independent of individual subjects, and cf Stephen Pepper's pluralism of world hypotheses); the relative inclusiveness of the different perspectives themselves - philosophies as moments of absolute thought (cf Josiah Royce (preliminary) and Wayne Booth's methodological pluralism ('The truth is forever richer than its formulations'); a fourth kind of pluralism has its source in the mind itself (cf Dewey's different types of philosophies of knowledge and Richard McKeon's first principles as determined by the nature of things > WW: archic pluralism) (..) A key factor in the development of pluralism is therefore a more accurate and sympathetic reading of texts. (..) An initial superiority of pluralistic to non-pluralistic modes of thought lies in their superior ability to interpret texts. (..) The alternative to pluralism is not some other philosophy, but only ignorance, illusion, and unwarranted privilege. (..) America's most important contribution to world philosophy will be the theory of pluralism in its multiple modes. (..) 2 Pluralism and Reality WW constructs four pure forms of pluralism from which mixed forms may be derived. (..) 1. For the perspectival pluralist, then, we have no access to the real except through our own perspectives. There are as many realities as there are perceivers. (cf Nelson Goodman's 'Ways of Worldmaking') The different views of others may be really incompatible, incommensurable, untranslatable. We can understand the other's reality only through the other as an experiencing center. 2. For the [ontological] pluralist of hypotheses, on the other hand, reality is one and the same for all: not the reality of our individual perceptions but of the entities that underlie these perceptions. Although different opinions may be and often are incompatible, the incompatible opinions will disappear as the truth is discovered. 3. For the methodological pluralist, reality must be such as to justify and relate the many partial views we have of it. The one reality of hypotheses includes all the conflicting views in which it is formulated. 4. For the archic pluralist, what is real is constituted by the inquirer, so that each philosophy has its own reality, as is the case for the perspectival pluralist. But since it is mind that constitutes the real, and mind is shared, philosophies are mutually intelligible as representing essential possibilities of reason. Compatibility is not manifested in a mutual intelligibility and translatability from one essential possibility to another. (..) 3. The Plurality of Valid Philosophies 1. For the perspectival pluralist, there are as many philosophies as there are perspectives, and the number of perspectives is infinite. 2. For the [ontological] pluralist of hypotheses, one must distinguish between opinions that stand in the way of apprehending reality and opinions that assist in apprehending reality. Useful hypotheses are in general readily testable. (..) A plurality of valid philosophies will result from differences in indispensable but unverified components. 3. For the methodological pluralist, the truth is the whole. He works with philosophies as parts of larger wholes and is therefore at the opposite extreme from the scientific pluralist who works with parts of philosophies that can be tested separately. (..) Since each philosophy depends on its principles, the focus here is on finding principles that unify principles. 4. The archic pluralist seeks to discover the essential modes in which the mind constitutes its philosophies. For him, the primary unity is the philosophy itself, not the parts of which it is composed or the larger wholes into which it may be sublated. His problem is to find the internal determinants of philosophies. Aristotle's causes are determinants of the kind that is being sought, and hence have been used for the purposes of systematic pluralism. (..) 4. The Functioning of Pluralism in Interpretation 1. For the perspectival pluralist, to understand the works of a person from within, therefore, we must understand them as expressions of the person who created them. 2. For the [ontological] puralist of hypotheses [finding] the fundamental underlying principles of the real determine all things, including ourselves, our various hypotheses about the real, and the works that we interpret. Endothenic interpretation here interprets the work in accordance with its own fundamental view of reality. Exothenic interpretation, on the other hand, interprets the work in accordance with the interpreter's fundamental view of reality and not in accordance with that of the work itself. 3. For the methodological pluralist, the Absolute, or whatever one prefers to call the one all-embracing principle, speaks through each of its manifestations, and all works are manifestations of one Absolute. Endothenic interpretation is interpretation in accordance with the inner truth of the work, that is, in accordance with its relation to the Absolute. Exothenic interpretation: possible for us to understand a work better than its author understood it. 4. For the archic pluralist, the work is determined by its intrinsic principles. A schema of these principles helps to determine which ones are functioning in the work and which are not; it makes the alternatives definite. |