about Rescher's position in volume III of the trilogy, Metaphilosophical Inquiries ('MI') (..) It is difficult not to like Rescher's pluralism. With philosophy determined as the answer to an existential need for rational systematization of perspectival experience, the position promises to span positions that are commonly divided. (..) Most briefly, perspectival pluralism is defeasibly committed to the thesis that philosophical assertions are defeasible commitments. (..) The particular originality of the approach, but also its particular adventure, is in a double commitment to a pluralist and a monist (dogmatic) thesis. The pluralist thesis: There is necessarily a multitude of (meta-)philosophical positions with conflicting cognitive- value standards or perspectives, since none of these perspectives can be ultimately justified and thus proven superior. The monist thesis: Whenever we philosophize we have already adopted a perspective and thereby must assume that the particular position engendered by this perspective is universally valid and thus superior. (..) the three central questions involved: [1] why we should be pluralists on the one hand, [2] why monists on the other, and [3] how we can consistently be pluralists and monists at once. (..) [1] Why should we accept the pluralist thesis? Rescher holds that the eventual unification of the factual plurality of experiential schemes, of standards of inquiry, and accordingly of philosophical positions is "in principle impossible" (10-3). three reasons supporting this claim: the evidential underdetermination of experiential categories, the overcommitment carried by philosophical principles, and the failure of consensus theories. (..) underdetermination of experiential categories (..) Why "human experience" must be fundamentally diverse does not, however, become completely clear. We must take the thesis of experiential divergence to refer to social rather than individual experience. Underdetermination-argument based on 3 premisses: our experiental categories essentially relate to dispositional properties (same experience under different dispositional descriptions); ontological interpretation of dispositional predicates; novelty (dispositional properties of concrete entities change over time and differently at different times and places) (..) As long as a coherent non-epistemic interpretation of dispositional properties (in terms of processes or real relations [process-ontology or substance-ontology]) is missing, it is not clear precisely how Rescher supports his claim about the necessary diversity of human experience. (..) overcommitment of philosophical principles (..) Abstract generalizations of experiential contents in philsophical theories amount to overcommitments; resulting sets of theses are inconsistent. (..) Rescher claims, philosopher's tools are inadequate for philosopher's tasks. As soon as philosophers try to sharpen their conceptual tools with strict generalizations, the conceptual network, balanced by vagueness, becomes incoherent. (..) This line of thought would indeed provide strong grounds for the pluralist thesis, if Rescher were not also to suggest, surprisingly, assimilating philosophical tasks and tools. (..) For reasons of rationality philosophers should accordingly resort to generalizations that express, not strict universality, but merely standards of normalcy. (..) But "standardist generalizations" do not generate apories (>proliferation of theories), so we lose a strong argument for the pluralist thesis. (..) the failure of consensus theory (..) heterogenity of philosophical positions is palpable (emperical argument) and due to 'experiental perspectivity' consensus is impossible (principled argument) (..) If consensus is postulated, following Peirce's conception of scientific truth, as the limit of a convergent series of philosophical theories, then factual divergence presents strong counterevidence. Apel's account of consensus, however, does not have the ideality of the mathematical limit but the 'embedded' ideality of a regulative idea whose realization is the transcendental presupposition of rationality in general. (..) a logical claim about the competence of actual reasoners, i.e., about what they must be thought to be committed to for acts of rational communication to be possible; it is not a claim about their actual performance. Thus, as a transcendental presupposition the moral postulate for the realization of consensus remains in place even if factual dissens should prove ineradicable. (..) [2] Why should we accept the monist thesis? (..) "the principles of rationality remain uniform and invariant throughout" (14-18), "to maintain anything seriously is to assert implicitly.. .that there are standards of cogency" (14-8) rational argumentation involves "absolutist commitments" (14-20) (..) Why - if we are not to fall back on a transcendental-pragmatic argument - is cogency, the claim to universal validity, an illocutionary presupposition of rational discourse? (..) [3] Can we be pluralists and monists at once? "A perspectival pluralism can thus also be characterized as a perspectival monism" (8-19). (..) Rescher claims that there is plurality of valuative perspectives aspiring to universal validity is itself the expression of such a perspective. (..) JS (a) The conflict between pluralist thesis and monist thesis could be avoided only if they are asserted at different levels of metaphilosophical reflection. (..) (b) The textual conflict is, I believe, indicative of a systematic difficulty. Rescher must hold to both the pluralist and monist theses at the same reflective level, if he is to demonstrate the defects of the main rival monist and pluralist positions. (..) Thus, the relationship between pluralist and monist strands in Rescher's approachm must be one of co-ordination and not subordination by embedding, if he is to eliminate both doctrinalist and indifferentist attitudes in metaphilosophy. A dilemma results. Either perspectival pluralism is inconsistent since it consists of conflicting commitments; or, on the other hand, if the conflict between these commitments is defused by a distinction in levels of evaluation, not all metaphilosophical positions rival to perspectival pluralism are proved inferior. (..) Is perspectival pluralism coherently self-applicable? (..) Rescher envisages a self-application of perspectival pluralism in the sense of applying the monist component to the thesis of perspectival pluralism. This yields the following result: (..) Perspectival pluralism is the expression of a particular valuative perspective which claims ultimate superiority, and justifiedly so relative to the reflective level of this assertion. (..) However, if we apply to the thesis of perspectival pluralism as well its pluralist component a conflict arises: (..) Perspectival pluralism is the expression of a particular valuative perspective which cannot justifiedly claim ultimate superiority relative to the reflective level of this assertion. (..) To rephrase this last difficulty more briefly, Janus, the only true pluralist, holds 'two views at once' precisely at the expense of having a perspective. |