The problems with Dilworth's theses and methods are serious and, most crucially, structural. First, he begins with the assertion that "perfect perceptions of the world and of human life have been realized in history" (p. 1). (..) Yet, he never fleshes out precisely how the diversity of "local" philosophies embodies a supposed universal "perfection." Nor does he even critique the highly political notion that one can indeed have a perfect perception of the world; it is simply stated as unproblematic. (..) While his desire is to respect philosophical pluralism, he sets disturbingly narrow conceptual parameters for that diversity and does not even consider what may possibly exist beyond those parameters. (..) Dilworth argues for a finite (in this case, precisely sixteen) number of categories in which all world philosophies must locate themselves. The kind of thinking, which seeks to project and impose unabashedly Western (in this case, Aristotelian) categories as essentialities on the world stage, so that others can and should (indeed must) find themselves theoretically, is a methodological step backward. (..) The type of comparative hermeneutic that he desires must not only clarify and expand what it counts as legitimate "worldviews," but it must be more than willing to expand its frames of reference if the entire globe is to be respected and represented. Anything less than this is disingenuous. |