ABSTRACT. I give the label "ethical pluralism" to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maxi mally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents - should any exist - who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid', and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people's wrong behavior, together with accep tance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. (..) I propose to call any well-known moral view or code traditional if it has this feature: It does not grant exemptions from its own binding rules or principles to agents - should any exist - who adhere to a competing valid moral view. (..) I propose to call a moral view valid if it is sufficiently well-justified to be worthy of being adopted by human beings to regulate their conduct. (..) a moral view is valid if it is in maximally satisfactory equilibrium with considered moral judgments and background theories. (..) it seems likely that there are multiple, competing valid moral views. I call that likely position ethical pluralism. (..) Ethical pluralism in the sense that interests us here is distinct from normative-level pluralism. A normative-level moral view is pluralistic if it posits a plurality of basic principles, or of goods, etc. (..) some competing moral views may be valid without all moral views being valid (..) o ethical pluralism does not imply cultural ethical relativism. (..) have offered a formulation of a weak conception of acceptance on which, arguably, an ethical pluralist can honestly accept a traditional moral view. Central to this formulation are what I have called a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people's wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. I believe that these preserve enough of the usual indicia of acceptance of a moral view so that my conception of acceptance is recognizable as a weak variant of the common conception. |