The logical impossibility of a pluralist view of religion means that the typology of exclusivism (one revelation is true), inclusivism (one true revelation (as fulfilment), but also incomplete true fragments in other (unfulfilled)revelations) and pluralism (all revelations are equally true) as three approaches or paradigms regarding Christianity's view of other religions is untenable. (..) argument: pluralism must always logically be a form of exclusivism and nothing called pluralism really exists (..) pluralism's logic is no different from the exclusivist position (..) the only difference is in terms of truth claims and the critera for truth employed by the practicioners (..) all pluralists are committed to holding some form of truth criteria and by virtue of this, anything that falls foul of such criteria is exluded from counting as truth. (..) more interesting question: what are the criteria: what counts as normative truth and how does it operate? (..) demonstration of exclusivism by: John Hick's philosophical pluralism and Paul Knitter's practial or pragmatic pluralism (..) e.g. transcendental agnosticism has very specific truth claims that are also exclusive truth claims. (..) The irony about tolerant pluralism is that it is eventually intolerant towards most forms of orthodos religious belief. (..) Knitter: truth in certain forms of social action. (..) But action with which tradition specific narrative (e.g. role women)? (..) again: different positions imply exclusivism (..) The general point I have been trying to make is that pluralism as a category simply does not exist, only another form of excusivism. (..) usually those called pluralists are exclusivists without knowing, (..) anonymous exclusivists. |