While accepting species pluralism, this paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so-called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts. (..) there is overlap with respect to the mechanisms that bring about the units called species. Often common descent and ecological selection, as well as interbreeding are important for maintaining the coherence of a species. And because of this overlap and continuous transition between different evolutionary mechanisms, it is not obvious what counts as a unique and separate factor. (..) Templeton’s cohesion concept or Waples’s evolutionary significant-unit concept both include interbreeding and ecological competition. It is the case for many species concepts that they combine elements that Ereshefsky treats as independent mechanisms. (..) Ereshefsky’s strong ontological requirement that a concept is theoretically useful only insofar as it is a category in his sense, is overly restrictive. |