Braddon-Mitchell, D. & C. West, Temporal Phase Pluralism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 59-83

'Temporal Phase Pluralism' allows that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life-altering choices. [ example of explanatory pluralism ]
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transfigurations: changes occurring within the lifespan of a person. (..) relations of person stages to whole persons (..) sufficient change in qualitative identity can amount to a change in numerical identity.
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We need to distinguish between the personal identity role, and the particular properties that might play that role.
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Practice-dependent view of personal identity: which property does it take to survive.
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Mark Johnston thinks of persons as substances that pass through phases. The peculiar thing is that the persistence conditions for the substance as a whole vary from phase to phase.
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The question of how to put the temporal parts or person-stages together into parts of a single, whole, continuing person.
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We think that it is no accident that many of our most central beliefs, practices and affiliations are understood in terms of identity. We talk about national identity, sexual identity and ethnic identity.
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When we are faced with the most difficult decisions we are more alone than ever. For we act, not as a person, but as a fragment [fragmented person-stage].