ABSTRACT Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with 'anything goes': we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown. (..) Explanatory pluralists subscribe to the following two theses: (1) There are no general exclusion rules with respect to explanations in history and social science; it is, for instance, impossible to rule out intentional explanation or functional explanations. (2) There are no general preference rules with respect to explanations in history and social science; it is, for instance, unwarranted to claim that intentional explanations are always better than macro-explanations. (..) Explanations of plain facts (answers to non-contrastive questions) have to show how the observed fact was actually caused. (..) Secondly, explanation-seeking questions can require the explanation of a contrast (..) having a therapeutic function, or are motivated by 'unexpectedness'. (..) Why does object a have property P? This formulation allows for many relevance relations. More specific formulations would be: What is the cause of a having property P? What is the function of a having property P? What is the reason for a having property P? (..) we have a pragmatic reason for being pluralist in the remote causes vs. proximate causes debate: depending on the context, one or the other type of explanation is the best relative to our motivation for asking the question. (..) By an intentional explanation we mean an explanation of a social fact in terms of the intentional states (desires, opinions, perceived opportunities) and actions of one or more individuals. In our conceptual scheme, intentional explanations are always micro-explanations. As we have already mentioned, we define structural explanations as macro-level explanations that are causal. Functional explanations are macro-level explanations that are not causal. (..) Purpose-based pluralism (version Jackson and Pettit). Many explanation-seeking questions can be answered in different ways (employing different types of explanation). In every context, it is possible to compare alternative explanations with respect to their accuracy (correctness, that is, their relation with reality) and adequacy (their relation to what the explainee expects from the explanation, the purpose of the explanation). In most cases adequacy enables us to rank correct explanations and single out one that is better than the others. (..) Purpose-based pluralism (version VB&W). Many explanation-seeking questions can be answered in different ways (employing different types of explanation). In every context, it is possible to compare alternative explanations with respect to their accuracy (correctness, that is, their relation with reality), adequacy (their relation to what the explainee expects from the explanation) and their efficiency (the amount of work that is needed to construct the explanation). In most cases adequacy combined with efficiency enables us to rank correct explanations and single out one that is better than the others. (..) However, we think there are reasons for also adopting another type of pluralism, which we call question-based pluralism. (..) Question-based pluralism. For every social or historical phenomenon, there are many interesting and legitimate explanation-seeking questions that can be asked. In some cases, the relevance relations that are inherent in these questions are different, so that it is impossible to answer all of them by means of one type of explanation. (..) Consider the following explanation-seeking question: (VII) Why does the nation-state exist in capitalist society? (VIII) What is the cause of there being nation-states in capitalist society? (IX) What is the function of there being nation-states in capitalist society? (..) the focus in defending pluralism must be on questions, not on answers: once we admit that questions of type (C) are intrinsically interesting, a minimal pluralism (namely, allowing both functional versus causal explanations) is required. (..) Let us now consider three explanation-seeking questions related to Taylor’s reformulation of Skocpol’s explanation of social revolutions: (X) Why did the French Revolution start in 1789, rather than in 1750? (XI) Why was there a revolution in Bourbon France, Manchu China, and Romanov Russia? (XII) Why did the French Revolution occur in 1789? (..) Our three questions about the French Revolution provide an argument for both question-based and purpose-based pluralism. Some questions, like (XII), can be answered only by a micro-explanation; other questions, like (XI), need a macroexplanation. This is due to the inherent relevance relation. (..) Thus, a battery of non-relativist criteria exists that provide a strong basis for preferring one explanation or explanation-type over another even though for any phenomenon there is a plurality of possible and legitimate explanations and explanation-types. These criteria include adequacy, efficiency, and relevance. In evolutionary biology, evolution is said to have several causes, sometimes called evolutionary pressures: migration, mutation, natural selection, and genetic drift. Likewise, we have argued that the plurality of explanations in history and the social sciences has different causes and possible justifications: adequacy, efficiency, and strictness of the relevance relation inherent in some questions. These three plurality pressures enable us to give a pragmatist argument for pluralism (our first aim), and allow for the distinction between question-based and purposepluralism (our second aim). |